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Risk 
• The extent to which an entity is threatened by a 
potential circumstance or event. 
• Risk is typically a function of: 
• The adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance 
or event occurs; 
• The likelihood of occurrence. 
Information Security Risks 
• Those risks that arise from loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of information or 
information systems and reflect the potential 
adverse impacts to organizational operations, 
organizational assets, and individuals.
Risk Management 
• The process of Identifying , assessing and 
evaluating the level of risk facing the organization, 
and then deciding what countermeasures to take 
in reducing risk to an acceptable level 
Risk Management Process (NIST) 
Assess 
• Identify
• Threats to organizations (i.e., operations, assets, or 
individuals)
• Vulnerabilities internal and external to organizations; 
• The harm (i.e., adverse impact) that may occur
• The likelihood that harm will occur. 
• The end result is a determination of risk
Respond 
• Developing alternative courses of action for 
responding to risk
• Evaluating the alternative courses of action
• Determining appropriate courses of action 
consistent with organizational risk tolerance;
• Implementing risk responses based on selected 
courses of action
Monitor 
• Determine the ongoing effectiveness of risk 
responses 
Problem 
• The current common approaches for risk 
assessment (likelihood and impact) and the 
implementation of response are problematic at 
best 
Likelihood of Occurrence  
The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted risk 
factor based on an analysis of the probability that 
a given threat is capable of exploiting a given 
vulnerability (or set of vulnerabilities). 

Determine the Likelihood a Harm will Occur 
Potential Impact 
• The magnitude of harm that can be expected to 
result from the consequences of unauthorized 
disclosure of information, unauthorized 
modification of information, unauthorized 
destruction of information, or loss of information or 
information system availability.
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Market for Lemons (Akerlof 1970) 
• A market with asymmetric information
$2000 $1000
Cybersecurity Market
• Vendors may make claims about the security of 
their products, but in the absence of evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of the products, 
buyers have no reason to trust them. 
Solutions for Lemon Markets  
• Warranties  
• More information regarding the product 
The Million Dollar Question 
• What should be done in effort to support CISOs’ 
and General Counsels’ decision making regarding 
the assessment of risks as well as the adoption of 
security policies and tools within their 
organizations?  
• Stresses moving beyond decision makers’ political, 
financial, social background and personal 
experience to a model in which tools’ adoption 
and policy enforcements decisions are made 
based on scientific studies findings. 
Evidence-Based Cybersecurity  (EBCS)
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Rigorous Scientific Research Designs 

Key Principals of the Approach 
Generate and employ empirical evidence to:  
- Identify online threats and vulnerabilities and educate 
targets of cybercrime 
- Guide policy development and guardians’ efforts  to 
secure cyberspace
- Guide the design and configuration of computing   
environments that can mitigate effectively the 
consequences cybercrime events
Evidence Based Cybersecurity and 
Threat Assessments (Examples) 
A Threat-Oriented Approach
• A threat-oriented approach starts with the 
identification of threat sources and threat events, 
and focuses on the development of threat 
scenarios; vulnerabilities are identified in the 
context of threats, and for adversarial threats, 
impacts are identified based on adversary intent. 
The Origin and Time of Attacks Against a 
Network (Maimon et al 2013) 
Data
• Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) data from a large 
university computer network 
• Potential attack attempts (unlike for incidents, false alarms might 
exist)
• Collected between September 2007 and until 2009
Hourly Distribution of Computer-Focused Crimes
Time of day 2007
(N = 2,168, 478)
2008
(N = 3,270,895)
2009
( N = 645,554)
9:00am – 4:59pm 59.04% 38.25% 50.06%
5:00pm- 12:59am 16.19% 27.36% 21.44%
1:00am-8:59am 24.8% 34.39% 28.5%
Foreign Network Users and Computer-Focused Crimes 
Against the Network
2007 2008 2009
IRR 95% CI IRR 95% CI IRR 95% CI
Population between 
15-64 years
1.13*** 1.06, 1.20 1.15*** 1.09, 1.22 1.18**
*
1.10, 
1.25
% Urban  1.04*** 1.02, 1.06 1.01* 1.00, 1.03 1.03** 1.01, 
1.05
Internet users  1.03*** 1.01, 1.05 1.03*** 1.02, 1.05 1.02* 1.00, 
1.03
Foreign network users 
per 1000 users  
1.64* 1.00, 2.98 1.58* 1.05, 2.38 1.43* 1.05, 
1.95 
*p<0.05    **p<0.01    ***p<0.001
An Asset/Impact-Oriented Approach
• An asset/impact-oriented approach starts with the 
identification of impacts or consequences of 
concern and critical assets, possibly using the 
results of a mission or business impact analyses 
and identifying threat events that could lead to 
and/or threat sources that could seek those 
impacts or consequences. 

! "#"$%&'()* +,-$./0$1---$2*/0*3
! 145$.6(*6()'$+7854$./0$1---$2*/0*3
! ,19$&:$;6/$%&'()*$<)=$,"9$&:
;6/$.6(*6()'$&>>200/=$:0&?
2)(@/0*(;A$)/;B&0C
34% 32%
47%
18%
University Network Other Network
Student Not a Student
Predicted Probability of Students and Non-Students to Click on 
Links Embedded in Suspicious Emails while Using University and 
Non-University Networks
39%
17%
37%
34%
University Network Other Network
Employee Not an Employee
Predicted Probability of Employees and Non-Employees to Click on 
Links Embedded in Suspicious Emails while Using University and 
Non-University Networks 
A Vulnerability-Oriented Approach
• A vulnerability-oriented approach starts with a set 
of predisposing conditions or exploitable 
weaknesses/deficiencies in organizational 
information systems or the environments in which 
the systems operate, and identifies threat events 
that could exercise those vulnerabilities together 
with possible consequences of vulnerabilities 
being exercised.
Diffusion of Viruses, Worms and Trojans 
Evidence Based Cybersecurity and 
Response Effectiveness (Example) 

Lévesque et al (2013)
38% of the study participants
were exposed to malware
20% of the computers were 
infected by some form of malicious 
software that was not detected by 
the antivirus
• Risk assessments should be guided by the design of rigorous 
scientific studies and the collection of evidence which will provide 
more accurate probabilities of threats to develop 
• Rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of cybersecurity tools and 
policies could improve the security posture of organizations and 
individuals, and in turn, reduce the occurrence of successful 
cybercrime events
• To guide CISOs and GC decision making regarding security related 
issues, such information should be publicly available and accessible 
In conclusion,
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